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We introduce a measure of the severity of violations of the revealed
preference axioms, the money pump index (MPI). The MPI is the
amount of money one can extract from a consumer who violates the
axioms. It is also a statistical test for the hypothesis that a consumer
is rational when behavior is observed with error. We present an ap-
plication using a panel data set of food expenditures. The data exhibit
many violations of the axioms. Mostly, the MPI for these violations is
small. The MPI indicates that the hypothesis of consumer rationality
cannot be rejected.
I. Introduction
The assumption that consumers are rational is one of the oldest and
most controversial assumptions in economics. Conceptually, the empir-
ical content of the rationality assumption has been very well understood
since the works of Samuelson (1938), Richter (1966), Afriat (1967), and
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Varian (1982): revealed preference theory captures the empirical con-
tent of rational consumption behavior.
As a practical matter, however, revealed preference analysis is prob-
lematic because of the “all or nothing” nature of the exercise: either a
data set satisfies the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP)
or it does not. In practice, however, it is useful to gauge how severely
consumers violate the axiom. Our paper presents a new measure of the
severity of a violation of GARP. The measure is based on the idea that
a consumer who violates GARP is subject to being exploited as a “money
pump.” We propose that the severity of a violation be measured by the
amount of money that could be extracted from the consumer; we call
this the money pump index (MPI).
The MPI implements a statistical test for the hypothesis of consumer
rationality. A violation of GARP may be the result of measurement errors
in prices or in consumer choices. The MPI measures how likely it is that
a violation of GARP is due to such errors and essentially compatible
with rational behavior.
We present an empirical application to household-level “scanner”
panel data containing time series of household-level food grocery pur-
chases collected at checkout scanners in supermarkets. In contrast to
many earlier studies, using more aggregate or cross-sectional consump-
tion data, our analysis revealed a substantial number of violations of
GARP. Specifically, 396 out of the 494 households in our data set violate
GARP at some point. However, most of these violations are not severe:
our MPI is centered around 6 percent of a household’s food expen-
ditures, or about $12.80 when evaluated at the average monthly food
expenditure of $213.
The magnitudes of the MPI appear intuitively very small (in both
dollar and percentage terms). We proceed to formally use the MPI to
test the hypothesis of consumer rationality. We test whether the MPI
could be accounted for simply by measurement errors in the variables.
In our empirical application, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis
that the observed MPIs are consistent with rational behavior and mea-
surement errors. In other words, the apparently small 6 percent MPI is
also small in a statistical sense.
We correlate our measure with demographic variables. Most results
are intuitive: less educated, poorer, and older households make more
severe violations of GARP than highly educated, richer, and younger
households do. On the other hand, smaller households make more
severe violations of GARP. Moreover, because the demand for many
food grocery items reflects seasonal trends, we also check whether GARP
violations are more severe when comparing consumption between peak
and nonpeak seasonal periods. We find no evidence of this, implying
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Fig. 1.—Two observations: (x, p) and . A, (x, p) and violate GARP (in′ ′ ′ ′(x , p ) (x , p )
fact WARP). B, A more “severe” violation of GARP.
that consumption in our data can be modeled by stable preferences
that exhibit no seasonal component.
Money pump.—Our measure of the severity of a GARP violation is
motivated by the idea that a violation of GARP exposes a consumer to
being manipulated as a “money pump.” For example, consider the sit-
uation in figure 1A. A consumer buys bundle x at prices p and at′x
prices . Evidently, there is a violation of GARP (actually of WARP, the′p
weak axiom of revealed preference) because x was purchased when ′x
was affordable, and vice versa. Knowing these choices, a devious “ar-
bitrager” who follows the opposite purchasing strategy (buying bundle
x at prices and bundle at prices p) could profitably resell x to the′ ′p x
consumer at prices p and at prices . The total profit the arbitrager′ ′x p
would make equals
′ ′ ′mpp p 7 (x x ) p 7 (x  x).
We use the magnitude mp, “money pump cost,” to measure the severity
of the violation of GARP. Specifically, our MPI is the money pump cost
expressed as a percentage of expenditure.
The MPI is an intuitive measure of the severity of a violation of GARP.
Consider the situations in figures 1A and B. Each figure presents a
violation of GARP, but intuitively the violation in panel B is more severe
than the one in panel A. The money pump cost reflects this difference.
Figures 2A and B represent the money pump cost: it is the sum of the
translation of the p-budget line (from crossing x to crossing ) and the′x
translation of the -budget line (from crossing to crossing x). The′ ′p x
money pump represents the severity of the violations, and it is expressed
in monetary terms, so the numerical value of a violation has a clear
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Fig. 2.—Money pump costs for figure 1. A, Two observations: (x, p) and . B,′ ′(x , p )
, , .′ ′ ′mpp a b ap p 7 (x x ) bp p 7 (x  x)
interpretation. As we explain below, it also functions as a formal test
statistic.
The idea that arbitragers can “pump money” from irrational consum-
ers is not new, and it has been used as a reason for why one should not
observe irrational behavior. For our purposes, however, the devious ar-
bitrager is a fictional character. There is a debate on whether GARP
violators would be driven out of the market because of the actions of
arbitragers who exploit them as money pumps (see, e.g., Mulligan 1996;
Rabin 2002; Laibson and Yariv 2007). We do not take a stand on the
issue: our use of the money pump is purely an application of the idea
captured by figure 1.
Panel data.—Many of the recent studies of GARP employ repeated
cross-sectional data; tests of GARP implemented on such data require
some sort of aggregation or “matching” of similar households across
different cross sections. In contrast, our panel data allow us to study
how household purchases vary with prices over time without the need
to aggregate or “match” consumers. By focusing on supermarket pur-
chases, we also observe a higher frequency of price changes relative to
expenditure, compared to standard cross-sectional consumption data
sets. As is well known (see, e.g., Blundell, Browning, and Crawford 2003),
a large variability in expenditure relative to prices can result in GARP
having low power.
II. Related Literature
The literature on testing the revealed preference axioms is large and
contains both classical papers and more recent contributions. Afriat
(1967) and Varian (1982) are seminal contributions to the methodology
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of revealed preference tests; Varian (2006) provides a survey. Empirical
applications of revealed preference tests have employed both field and
experimental data.
In principle, tests of WARP/GARP require repeated observations of
a decision-making unit (individual or household) across different pric-
ing regimes. However, many of the empirical investigations of GARP
using field data employ data from cross-sectional household-level surveys
(such as the Consumer Expenditure Survey in the United States and
the Family Expenditure Survey in the United Kingdom). Thus, an im-
portant challenge addressed in these papers is how to “match” house-
holds across different time periods to form a synthetic panel. Blundell
et al. (2003) and Blundell, Chen, and Kristensen (2007) address this
issue by estimating an “Engel curve” relating a household’s consumption
to prices, expenditure, and household demographics, and they test
GARP by comparing the predicted consumption behavior of households
with similar demographics and expenditure levels across different pric-
ing regimes. Hoderlein and Stoye (2009) take a more agnostic approach
and use results from the copula literature to obtain bounds on the
percentage of households that violate WARP in two separate cross sec-
tions of survey data.
In the present paper, we avoid these difficulties by using a long house-
hold-level scanner panel data set, where the purchase decisions of given
households over a 2-year period are observed. To our knowledge, testing
the revealed preference axioms using scanner data is new in the lit-
erature.
At the same time, a large literature testing revealed preference using
experimental data has also developed. This literature has employed both
laboratory experiments (recent contributions include Sippel [1997],
Andreoni and Miller [2002] and Fevrier and Visser [2004]) and field
experiments utilizing unique subject pools (psychiatric patients in Bat-
talio et al. [1973], children in Harbaugh, Krause, and Berry [2001], and
tufted capuchin monkeys in Chen, Lakshminarayanan, and Santos
[2006]).
It is fair to say that most of the empirical literature, using both field
and experimental data, finds relatively few violations of GARP. There-
fore, the power of GARP as a test of rationality is a real concern; these
issues have been discussed in, among others, Bronars (1987), Blundell
et al. (2003), Andreoni, Gillen, and Harbaugh (2011), and Beatty and
Crawford (2011). Experiments suffer less from this problem because
they are often carefully designed to avoid power issues (see, e.g., An-
dreoni and Miller 2002).
At the same time, revealed preference tests are quite stark, allowing
for either rational or irrational consumers. In practice, one would like
to accommodate a grey area in which “small” violations of GARP may
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not indicate a worrying degree of irrationality (or may indicate imper-
fections in the data). In the existing literature, various researchers have
proposed ways to quantify the degree of violations from GARP, including
Afriat (1967), Varian (1985, 1990), Gross (1995), and Heufer (2008).1
In terms of assessing the severity of violations of GARP, MPI is closest
in spirit to the efficiency index originally proposed by Afriat (1967) and
subsequently modified by Varian (1990). Jerison and Jerison (2011) is
a recent contribution, relating Afriat’s efficiency index to a measure of
the asymmetry of the Slutsky matrix. Choi et al. (2011) use Afriat’s index
on data from a large-scale field experiment; they find some of the same
qualitative empirical results as we do using MPI on scanner data (spe-
cifically the results we report in Sec. IV.C). We review these developments
in Section III.B below.
III. Methodology
A. Money Pump Index
Suppose that we observe the purchases of a single consumer when she
faces different prices. Observation k ( ) consists of a con-kp 1, … , K
sumption bundle that the consumer bought at pricesk l kx   p 
.l
Let X be the set of all observed consumption bundles; that is, Xp
. The revealed preference relation on X is the binaryk{x : kp 1, … , K }
relation R defined as if . The strict revealed pref-k l k k k lx R x p 7 x ≥ p 7 x
erence relation is the binary relation P defined as ifk l k kx P x p 7 x 1
.k lp 7 x
The data satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP) if whenever
it is false that .k l l kx R x x P x
The data satisfy the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP) if
there is no sequence such thatk k k1 2 nx , x , … , x
k k k k k1 2 n n 1x R x R, … , R x while x P x . (1)
A violation of GARP is identified with a sequence . Wek k k1 2 nx , x , … , x
say that n is the length of the sequence.
Given a sequence for which (1) holds, we can computek k k1 2 nx , x , … , x
the money pump cost associated to this sequence as
n
k k kl l l1p 7 (x  x )
lp1
(taking ).k p kn1 1
1 Apesteguia and Ballester (2010) axiomatize a measure of deviations from rationality.
It applies in general choice environments with finitely many choices. It does not use the
special structure of Walrasian budgets.
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Our money pump cost is measured in dollars. In order to compare
this cost across consumers with different budgets, we normalize the cost
by each household’s total expenditure. Specifically, the MPI equals the
money pump cost as a proportion of total expenditure: if (1) holds for
the sequence , we compute the MPI of the sequence ask k k1 2 nx , x , … , x
n k k kl l l1 p 7 (x  x )lp1
MPI p (2)k k k k1 1 n n{(x ,p ),…,(x ,p )} n k kl l p 7 xlp1
(taking ).k p kn1 1
Note that MPI is measured for each violation of GARP. In the em-
pirical application in Section IV.B, we sometimes report a household-
level MPI by computing the mean and median MPI across the different
violations of GARP for a given household.
Remark 1. Calculating money pump costs can be a huge compu-
tational task. For the data we present in Section IV, , so thereKp 26
are
26
26 25(k 1)! ≈ 4.39239# 10 ( )kkp2
potential cycles, which are unique up to rotations. There are fast al-
gorithms for checking if GARP has been violated (see Varian 1982), but
they do not suffice to calculate MPI.2
B. Comparison with Afriat’s Efficiency Index
We briefly review and compare our approach to the “efficiency indices”
proposed by Afriat (1967) and Varian (1990) to quantify violations from
GARP. Given , let and be the binary relations defined bye  [0, 1] R Pe e
if and if . Clearly, ifk l k k k l k l k k k lx R x ep 7 x ≥ p 7 x x P x ep 7 x 1 p 7 xe e
, then is the original revealed preference relation; so ifep 1 R Re 1
satisfies GARP, then the data are consistent with rationality. At the other
extreme, satisfies GARP trivially. Afriat’s efficiency index (AEI) is de-R 0
fined as the supremum over all the numbers e such that satisfies(R , P)e e
GARP.
The ideas behind AEI are similar to our MPI (perhaps unavoidably
so, as they try to measure the same phenomenon), but AEI and MPI
differ in their interpretations. MPI is the monetary magnitude that can
be extracted from a consumer that violates GARP. AEI can be inter-
preted as a “margin of error” (Varian 1990) that we allow the agent to
make in his consumption choices or as a tolerance for wasted expen-
diture.
The behaviors of the MPI and AEI can be quite different, and they
2 Warshall’s algorithm, suggested by Varian for checking GARP, can be used to calculate
an approximation of MPI.
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Fig. 3.—Two violations of WARP: (x, p), and (z, p),′ ′ ′ ′(x , p ) (x , p )
can give opposite conclusions on the same data. We present two simple
examples to illustrate this point. The first example is in figure 3, which
shows two pairs of observations and , which′ ′ ′ ′{(z, p), (x , p )} {(x, p), (x , p )}
both violate WARP. The MPIs for these observations are
′ ′ ′p 7 (z x ) p 7 (x  z)
′ ′MPI p{(z,p),(x ,p )} ′ ′p 7 z p 7 x
′ ′ ′p 7 (x x ) p 7 (x  x)
′ ′1 p MPI ,{(x,p),(x ,p )}′ ′p 7 x p 7 x
since, as drawn in figure 3, and .′ ′ ′ ′p 7 xp p 7 z p 7 (x  z) 1 p 7 (x  x)
We conclude that the violation in the data , is more severe′ ′(z, p) (x , p )
than in , .′ ′(x, p) (x , p )
Calculating the AEI for these pairs of violations yields
′ ′ ′p 7 z p 7 x p 7 x
′ ′AEI p max , p{(z,p),(x ,p )} ′ ′{ }p 7 x p 7 z p 7 z
′ ′ ′p 7 x p 7 x p 7 x
′ ′p p max , p AEI ;{(x,p),(x ,p )}′ ′{ }p 7 x p 7 x p 7 x
that is, the AEIs are the same for both violations.
As the example illustrates, the crucial difference between AEI and
MPI lies in how it treats each difference in a violationk k k lp 7 x  p 7 x
of GARP. The MPI simply adds up the differences, and the resulting
measure of a violation of GARP is the dollar amount that can be ex-
tracted by running the money pump implied by the violation of GARP.
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The AEI, on the other hand, seeks to “break” the violation of GARP at
its weakest link. Thus, once deflates a value of expendituree ! 1
to the point where there is no violation of GARP, the remainingk kp 7 x
differences play no role in the measure.3k k k lp 7 x  p 7 x
We illustrate the point with a second concrete example. The example
exhibits a small violation of GARP according to AEI but a large one
according to MPI. In fact, the violation is negligible according to AEI,
but the parameter d below can be chosen so that MPI is arbitrarily large.
Let , , , ,1 11 2 3 1 2p p ( , d) p p (d, ) p p (1, 1) x p (d , 0)d d
2 2d d2x p , ,( )2 21 d 1 d
and . Then , ,3 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3x p (1, 0) p 7 x p p 7 x p d p 7 x p p 7 x p d
, and . So the e-revealed preference relation3 3 3 1 2p 7 x p 1 p 7 x p d Re
satisfies GARP for any ; AEI therefore equals one.4 On the othere ! 1
hand,
2 21 d d 12MPIp , d (d , 0) ,  d,( ) ( ) ( )2 2{ [ ]d 1 d 1 d d
2 2d d
7 ,  (1, 0)  (d d 1)( )2 2[ ]}1 d 1 d
2(1, 1) 7 [(1, 0) (d , 0)]
 ,
d d 1
which approaches one as . So if d is small, MPI exhibits a larged r 0
violation of GARP, whereas the violation is mild according to AEI. Thus
the AEI and MPI can give the opposite conclusion on the same data.
The observations also suggest that MPI and AEI are more likely to differ
on longer sequences that violate GARP than on shorter sequences. As we shall
see in Section IV.B, that is indeed the case in our data.
C. Statistical Tests Using the MPI: How Large Is “Large”?
We formulate a statistical basis for testing whether a violation of WARP
could be explained by either simple mistakes on the part of the con-
3 Varian modifies AEI by allowing e to vary across the different price vectors, looking
at a vector . Varian’s measure is the closest distance to the unit vector ( ) of an(e ) e p 1k k
with no violations of GARP. This version of AEI suffers from the same problem. When(e )k
we minimize the distance , if we fix the value of one such that there is nok(e ) 1k ek k
violation of GARP, we want to set the other entries in the vector equal to one.
4 Similarly, Varian’s version of AEI would count these data as basically consistent with
GARP, as there are vectors arbitrarily close to (1, 1, 1) such that the corre-1 2 3(e , e , e )
sponding relations satisfy GARP.
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sumer or measurement errors in variables. Such an approach to testing
WARP was pioneered by Varian (1985, 1990).
We assume that there is measurement error in prices such that pp
, where p are observed prices, q are true but unobserved (latent)q 
prices, and  is an independent and identically distributed measurement
error drawn from a normal distribution with mean m and variance ,2j
independently across households and prices. The assumption that ob-
served prices contain measurement error is natural for our empirical
application below because differences between shelf prices (which are
observed) and transactions prices (which we do not completely observe)
constitute the most important source of measurement error in super-
market data sets.5
Recall that the money pump cost for observations 1 1 2((p , x ), (p ,
violating WARP is defined as2x ))
1 2 1 2ˆT { [(p  p ) 7 (x  x )]1 1 1 2 2MP {((p ,x ),(p ,x )) violate WARP}
1 2 1 2 1 2p [(q  q ) 7 (x  x ) (   )
1 27 (x  x )]1 .1 1 1 2 2 2{((q  ,x ),(q  ,x )) violate WARP}
Even with the normality assumption on the measurement errors (),
we cannot derive the distribution of under the null of rationality,ˆTMP
that is, that , satisfy WARP and that the observed violation1 1 2 2(q , x ) (q , x )
of WARP was generated only because of measurement error in prices.
However, taking a cue from Varian (1985), we can bound by anotherˆTMP
random variable and perform the desired hypothesis test based onTMP
the distribution of rather than . Specifically, because 1ˆT T (p MP MP
when violates WARP, we have2 1 2 1 1 2 2p ) 7 (x  x ) ≥ 0 ((p , x ), (p , x ))
1 2 1 2 1 2ˆT p [(q  q ) 7 (x  x ) (   )MP
1 27 (x  x )]1 (3)1 1 1 2 2 2{((q  ,x ),(q  ,x )) violate WARP}
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2p max {0, (q  q ) 7 (x  x ) (   ) 7 (x  x )}.
To proceed further, we require an additional assumption. Suppose that
we are given consumption bundles and that were chosen at some1 2x x
observed prices, and , respectively. Let us assume that and1 2 1 2p p x x
are rational choices at the true (but unobserved) prices, say and .1 2q q
Then it follows from Afriat’s theorem (see Afriat 1967; Varian 1985)
that there are positive numbers and such that1 2l l
1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1l q 7 (x  x ) l q 7 (x  x ) ≤ 0.
5 Varian (1985) assumed measurement error in choices rather than in prices. This
difference is insubstantial, as the test we describe below would also work for errors in
choices. For our empirical application, assuming measurement error in prices seems more
natural.
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The numbers and have a natural interpretation as Lagrange mul-1 2l l
tipliers. They are the marginal utility of a relaxation of the budget
constraint, the “marginal utility of income.” We make an additional
assumption that the two marginal utilities are equal.
Assumption. Equal marginal utility of income (EMUI): .1 2l p l
The EMUI assumption has a clear economic meaning: at the point
at which the purchases were made, an additional dollar in income would
result in the same increase in utility. It seems a reasonable assumption
for our application to supermarket purchases. Assuming EMUI, we ob-
tain that
1 2 1 2(q  q ) 7 (x  x ) ≤ 0.
Using this inequality in equation (3), we get
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2ˆT p max {0, (q  q ) 7 (x  x ) (   ) 7 (x  x )}MP
1 2 1 2≤ max {0, (   ) 7 (x  x )}{ T .MP
The upshot is that the observed money pump cost can be boundedˆTMP
from above by , which, given the distributional assumptions on ,TMP
follows a truncated normal distribution with mean zero and variance
.1 2 2 22 7 kx  x k 7 j
Given a nominal size a, then, we can find a critical value satisfyingCa
; we set , where denotes the cu-1P(T 1 C )p a C p F (1 a) FMP a a T TMP MP
mulative distribution function of . However, because , theˆT T ≤ TMP MP MP
“true size” of the test is
ˆP(T 1 C ) ≤ P(T 1 C )p a,MP a MP a
so there is a downward size distortion: When MPI is large enough to
warrant a rejection, we can do so with at least the desired confidence
. However, the test tends to underreject, which raises power prob-1 a
lems. We return to the power issue below in discussing the empirical
application.
Tests for longer cycles.—We focused on a test for violations of WARP,
but the same calculation holds for testing general violations of GARP.
The condition derived from Afriat’s theorem holds for general se-
quences of demands. Given K observations of consumptions and prices
and generalizing the EMUI assumption accordingly, we obtain
K
k k k1ˆT p p 7 (x  x ) 1 k k KMP {A(p ,x )S violates GARP}kp1[ ]
kp1
K
k k k1≤ max 0,  7 (x  x ) { T , MP{ }
kp1
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where follows a truncated normal with mean zero and varianceTMP
.K k k1 2 2 kx  x k 7 jkp1
IV. Empirical Results: Incidence and Severity of GARP Violations
A. Data Description
We use a household-level scanner panel data set, the so-called Stanford
Basket Dataset, which contains grocery expenditure data for 494 house-
holds from four grocery stores in an urban area of a large U.S. mid-
western city, between June 1991 and June 1993 (104 weeks). This data
set was collected by Information Resources, Inc. and has also been used
in, among others, Bell and Lattin (1998), Shum (2004), and Hendel
and Nevo (2006a, 2006b).
We focus in this paper on households’ expenditures on food cate-
gories, of which there are 14: bacon, barbecue, butter, cereal, coffee,
crackers, eggs, ice cream, nuts, analgesics, pizza, snacks, and sugar. We
restrict attention to food because we do not expect consumers to change
their food expenditure very dramatically in response to changes in in-
come; most foods are basic necessities, and the role for “luxurious”
spending on food is arguably more limited than for other types of
goods.6
We observe 103,345 transactions of 4,082 unique items, that is, unique
Universal Product Codes (UPC). Each transaction records the house-
hold identity, UPC, transaction week, consumed units, price per unit
(shelf prices), and the coupon value (if used).
For the prices in the empirical analysis, we used the “shelf prices,”
which are the prices posted in the supermarket at the time of purchase.
While the majority (86 percent) of transactions take place at shelf prices,
the actual transaction price may differ from the shelf price, primarily
because of the household’s use of coupon discounts. We did not in-
corporate coupons into our analysis explicitly because we observe cou-
pons only when a household uses them and do not observe coupon
availability when either an item is not purchased or the coupon is not
used. This partial observability of coupon discounts is problematic for
revealed preference analysis because the GARP inequalities depend on
a counterfactual calculation: how much would a consumption basket
6 By focusing on food expenditures, our approach requires an assumption that food
items are separable in households’ preferences, so that purchases of nonfoods affect food
consumption only through the income left over from such purchases. Hence, our test is
implicitly a joint test of rationality and separability for food. However, separability is ubiq-
uitous as an assumption in applied demand analysis and has been universally assumed in
applied work to reduce the dimensionality of demand system (a point emphasized by
Deaton and Muellbauer [1980] and Blundell [1988], among others).
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cost at prices at which another consumption basket was purchased?7 For
these reasons, we use shelf prices in our analysis and consider coupon
discounts as the primary source of measurement error in the price data.
In order to obtain consistent consumption data over goods, we ag-
gregate transactions by brand name and category: when distinct items
have a common brand name, their transactions are aggregated. Hence,
each “product” in the sample is a food product with a distinct brand
name, and we aggregate across all sizes/presentational forms of each
product. Analogously, aggregate prices and discounts at the product
level are obtained by averaging the prices and discounts of each size,
weighted by the amount consumed. To minimize stockpiling and in-
ventory issues, we also aggregate households’ expenditures for each
good over time to a 4-week period.
Even after this aggregation, not all brands are consumed for every
time period; some products enter, some exit, and many others are simply
unpopular items that are infrequently purchased by the households in
the data set. Since GARP requires price observations over every time
period, we use only brands for which price data are available for every
period. For this reason, we drop 12,976 (or 12.5 percent) of the pur-
chases from the data set.
B. GARP and MPI
Exploiting the panel nature of our data set, we next consider GARP
violations for each household separately. This allows for arbitrary un-
observed heterogeneity at the household level. The MPI is measured
for each violation of GARP; we consider the mean or the median MPI
across the household’s violations.
Table 1 presents a summary of our results. Out of 494 households,
395 (roughly 80 percent) of them violate WARP (GARP for sequences
of length 2) for at least some pairs of observations. Hence, a significant
proportion of households do exhibit violations of WARP; our result is
in contrast to much of the previous empirical literature, which fails to
find many violations. Given remark 1, we check only for violations of
GARP that involve cycles of limited length: lengths 2, 3, and 4.
In table 1, moving from left to right, we include progressively longer
cycles in testing GARP. When we include cycles of lengths 3 and 4,
thereby searching a substantially larger number of possible cycles (5,525
and 95,225, compared to 325), the overall number of households vio-
lating GARP increases only by one (from 395 to 396). In theory GARP
may be violated when WARP is satisfied. However, table 1 shows that
7 Moreover, there are a few cases in which discounts (coupon values per unit) exceed
shelf prices.
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TABLE 1
Money Pump: Calculated by Equation (2), Averaged over Households
Violating GARP
Cycle Lengths Included
{2} {2, 3} {2, 3, 4}
Total number of households 494 494 494
Households violating GARP 395 396 396
Mediana MPI 5.97% 5.95% 5.91%
Meana MPI 6.22% 6.12% 6.09%
Medianb (1  AEI) 2.40% 2.09% 2.03%
Meanb (1  AEI) 2.63% 2.38% 2.31%
Possible cycles 325 5,525 95,225
Median number of violations 2 3 3
Mean number of violations 3.028 4.833 6.008
a Numbers in these rows are the median/mean MPIs across all violations of GARP
among the sample households.
b Numbers in these rows are the median/mean values of (1  AEI) across all
violations of GARP among the sample households.
WARP closely approximates GARP in practice; only one household sat-
isfies WARP while violating GARP. Moreover, the median and mean
levels of MPI change only slightly as we search over longer cycles.
On the other hand, the severity of the violations, in terms of MPI
(see eq. [2]), is moderate or small: the mean and median MPIs, taken
across all households, are only about 6 percent of total expenditure.
To break this down further, we calculated, for each household, the
MPI of each violation of WARP and obtained the household-specific medi-
an level of MPI, across all the cycles for this household, which violated
WARP. In figure 4, we plot the cumulative distribution function of this
household-specific median MPI across the 395 households that exhibit
some violation of WARP. The function clearly rises very steeply for values
of the MPI less than 10 percent but is largely flat thereafter. This in-
dicates that a large majority of households have very small violations of
WARP, and only a handful of households have larger violations, ex-
ceeding 10 percent of expenditures. Thus, large violations do occur,
but they are infrequent.
Are these violations of GARP severe?—The finding that MPI is small is
reinforced by the results of using MPI as a statistical test; we follow the
method described in Section III.C. The observed standard deviation of
price discounts by coupons is (measured in cents per unit).jˆp 1.1143
Taking this as the value for the standard deviation in measurement error,
and at a nominal size of percent, we find no rejections of GARPap 5
at all; that is, none of the observed MPIs is large enough to warrant a
rejection at this nominal size.
Since, by construction, our test will underreject relative to the nominal
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Fig. 4.—Cumulative distribution of households’ median MPI
size, we reduced the value we used for the standard deviation of mea-
surement error even further. Only by reducing this standard deviation
by a factor of 5, to , are we able to reject around 5 percent1 jˆp 0.22295
of the observed MPIs. Hence, the value of j that we would need in
order to reject GARP at usual significance levels is substantially lower
than the standard deviation of price discounts in our data, which is a
reasonable proxy for measurement error. Despite the tendency of our
procedure to underreject, this is rather convincing evidence that the
MPI fails to reject GARP.
Table 1 also exhibits an empirical comparison of MPI with AEI. A
large value of AEI indicates a small violation, so we report instead the
values of . The correlation between MPI and may be1 AEI 1 AEI
instructive. The correlation is .7834, .6250, and .5197 for cycles of length
2, 3, and 4, respectively. As suggested by our discussion in Section III.B,
the AEI and MPI differ more the longer the length of the cycle in the
violation of GARP.8
C. Demographic Variables
Next, we consider the demographic determinants of rational (or irra-
tional) consumption behavior, as measured by the MPI. Table 2 shows
8 Using an approximation, we can compute these correlations for longer cycles. The
correlation continues to decrease: .24 and .44 for cycles of length 5 and 6, respectively.
The negative correlation at length 6 is purely driven by two specific observations.
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TABLE 2
Demographic Variables
Variable
Number of
Households
Family size:
Mid size (3, 4 members) 187
Large size (1 4 members) 65
Income:
Mid annual income ( [$20,000,
$45,000]) 200
High annual income (1 $45,000) 141
Age:a
Middle age 201
Old age 157
Education:b
High school 197
College 255
Total households 480
a Middle-aged households are those in which the average of
the spouses’ ages is between 30 and 65; in old-aged households,
this average exceeds 65.
b If both spouses are present in a household, the average
education of both spouses is reported.
the population distributions of the demographic variables.9 The pan-
elists are generally older, and their education levels are higher than the
general U.S. population.
Since MPI has a positive value only when consumptions violate WARP,
we consider censored Tobit regressions of MPI on demographic vari-
ables. Table 3 shows the regression results with 156,000 (p 480#
) observations: 480 households with possible pairs.26325 ( )2
MPI is higher for older, poorer, and less educated households than
for younger, richer, and more educated households. MPI is also higher
for smaller households.
V. Further Results
A. Seasonality and Stability of Preferences
A consumer may fail GARP because his preferences change: they are
not “stable.” Given two observations, and , it is possible′ ′(x, p) (x , p )
that x was a rational choice for a different utility function than . We′x
argue that unstable preferences would be reflected in a large MPI.
Therefore, our empirical findings support the hypothesis that prefer-
ences are stable.
9 The demographic data are missing for 14 households. We drop these from our data
set and work with 480 households.
This content downloaded from 131.215.225.158 on March 17, 2016 15:07:05 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
measure of revealed preference violations 1217
TABLE 3
MPI Explained by Demographic Variables: Results from Tobit (Censored)
Regressions
Variable Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
Middle age .0112
(1.92)
Old age .0126
(1.74)
Mid family .0161*** .0118* .0085
(3.55) (2.49) (1.66)
Large family .0281*** .0243*** .0190*
(4.04) (3.45) (2.52)
Middle income .0181*** .0169**
(3.44) (3.02)
High income .0154* .0142*
(2.57) (2.16)
High school .0154 .00874 .00768
(1.84) (1.02) (.89)
College .0162 .00666 .00441
(1.95) (.76) (.49)
Constant .452*** .450*** .463***
(30.63) (30.57) (27.56)
ja .195*** .195*** .195***
(36.65) (36.66) (36.66)
Observations 156,000 156,000 156,000
Note.—t statistics are in parentheses.
a Estimated standard deviation of errors in Tobit regression.
* p ! .05
** .p ! .01
*** .p ! .001
Consider a consumer who uses one utility for some purchases and
another utility for other purchases. We argue that this consumer’s MPI
is positive for arbitrarily small changes in prices. In fact, MPI is larger
when the difference in demands under both utilities is larger, thus
implying that when preferences are unstable, MPI can be interpreted
as a measure of this instability.
Specifically, consider figure 5A. Suppose that a household follows two
distinct utility functions. These two utility functions give rise to two
different demand functions: and . Fix prices p andd (p, I ) d (p, I )1 2
suppose that we observe ; see figure 5A. The second utility,xp d (p, I )1
on the other hand, would give demand . Now, by continuityxˆp d (p, I )2
of demand, if we choose prices close to p (as in the figure), then′p
is close to . But this implies a violation of WARP.′ ′ ˆx p d (p , I ) x2
The money pump cost of the violation of WARP in figure 5A is
. We can look at the money pump cost for an arbitrarily′ ′(p  p) 7 (x  x)
small change in prices. In particular, fix a direction of change in price
and consider an infinitesimal price change in p in the direction of∇p
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Fig. 5.—Unstable preferences. A, and . B,′ ′ ˆxp d (p, I) x p d (p , I) mpp ∇p 7 (x1 2
.x)
. So for . As  shrinks to zero, converges to ,′ ′ ˆ∇p p p p ∇p  1 0 x x
so the money pump cost approaches ; see figure 5B. So aˆ∇p 7 (x x)
small price change gives an increase in the money pump cost as long
as the change in prices forms an acute angle with the difference in the
demand functions. Note also that a larger difference in demands results
in a larger money pump cost for a given direction of change of prices.
Given this interpretation of the money pump cost as a measure of an
agent’s changes in preferences, we next look and see whether the MPI
(money pump cost as the proportion of expenditure) reflects seasonal
trends in demand for certain types of grocery items, because these trends
may be attributable to changes in preferences over time. Specifically,
we focus on the case of ice cream demand, for which the seasonal peak
in demand occurs during the summer months. If this seasonality is in
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TABLE 4
No Evidence of Changing Preferences: Ice Cream versus Other Foods
Spring Summer Fall Winter
Spring 1.3333 .6944 1.0556 .9375
(1.90%) (1.84%) (2.00%) (2.16%)
Summer . . . 1.2000 .8333 1.2292
(2.13%) (1.65%) (1.52%)
Fall . . . . . . 1.0667 .9583
(1.82%) (1.78%)
Winter . . . . . . . . . 1.6429
(1.87%)
Note.—Each cell contains the number of households that violate WARP between
any two months, as classified by the season of the months. (Corresponding average
MPIs for these violations are in parentheses.)
fact due to changing preferences, then we should expect to see larger
MPIs in cycles involving peak and nonpeak periods than in cycles in-
volving only nonpeak periods.
Such evidence is presented in table 4. For this exercise, we aggregate
consumption up to ice cream versus all other foods. For each pair of
periods, we count the number of households violating WARP and com-
pute the average of their median MPIs. Numbers (or parenthesized
numbers) in the table are the numbers of households (or average MPIs),
which are averaged over the pairs of periods falling into a corresponding
pair of seasons.
Surprisingly, we find no evidence of seasonality. For instance, MPIs
are 1.52 percent between the summer and winter months (a peak/
nonpeak comparison) versus 2.16 percent between the winter and spring
months (two nonpeak periods). This suggests that, while seasonality may
indeed be present, prices may also be moving in a fashion such that
agents’ resulting consumption choices do not violate GARP.10
More generally, we also repeated this exercise at the disaggregate level
without aggregating across different goods. Overall, we found no sys-
tematic patterns between MPIs and the periods across which we were
considering cycles. Again, this suggests that WARP violations are not
related to time or seasonality trends.11
10 Indeed, Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi (2003) provide evidence that prices on grocery
items tend to be lower during peak demand periods for these items (see also Nevo and
Hatzitaskos [2005] for further discussion). Such “countercyclical” price variation may mask
any seasonal variation in preferences and lead to no violations of revealed preference.
11 A similar empirical question of demand stability has been addressed in the agricultural
economics literature using revealed preference methods, e.g., Chalfant and Alston (1988)
and Jin and Koo (2003).
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B. Power of GARP and the Bronars Index
The vast majority of empirical studies of revealed preference find very
few violations of GARP, a stylized fact that is referred to as the “low
power” of GARP. To address this issue, “power indexes” have been de-
veloped to quantify the extent to which particular data sets may be useful
for testing GARP. A power index seeks to measure the extent to which
a collection of observed budget sets can detect violations of GARP. For
example, if we have two budgets B and that are nested (e.g.,′B BP
), then no choices by a consumer could reveal a violation of GARP.′B
The earliest and most well-known power index is that of Bronars (1987).
Specifically, the Bronars index measures the number of GARP violations
under the behavioral assumption that consumers made purely random
choices on their observed budget sets.
Typically, in cross-sectional data, income variability is much higher
than price variability; as a result, budget sets tend to be nested, and no
choices that exhaust the consumer’s budget can violate GARP. In con-
trast, in our application using scanner data, we found that a large frac-
tion of the households violate GARP. Nevertheless, we still computed
the Bronars index for the budgets observed in our data. First, we draw
random budget shares of goods from a continuous uniform distribution.
The generated budget shares are then multiplied by observed total ex-
penditure. We obtain the random consumption of each commodity by
dividing its budget share by the price. We subsequently check GARP
violation for each observation.12
We find, surprisingly, that the Bronars index indicates low power. We
repeat this procedure 100 times and find that among 494 households
there are, on average, only three to four violating GARP for each gen-
erated panel data set, much lower than the number of GARP violations
observed in the actual choice data.
Our finding illustrates a basic problem with the Bronars index. A
power index should reflect the probability that GARP is rejected when
it should be rejected: but Bronars calculates the probability of rejecting
GARP under purely random behavior. It is well known that random
behavior can be very close to rational (see Becker 1962). One would
instead want to measure the degree to which GARP is rejected under
some alternative, clearly irrational, model of behavior. Bronars does not
provide such a model; indeed, it seems very difficult to find an accept-
able alternative benchmark to rationality under which to measure
12 This computational method is the so-called method 2 in Andreoni et al. (2011).
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power; there is, in a sense, only one way to be rational but many more
ways to be irrational.13
VI. Conclusion
We present a new measure of the severity of a violation of GARP, the
money pump index (MPI). The measure is based on the idea that a
consumer who violates the axiom is subject to being exploited as a
money pump. The MPI has a simple interpretation as the certain dollar
amount that can be extracted from a consumer who behaves irrationally.
We carry out an empirical application using a scanner panel data set
of households’ food purchases at supermarkets. Almost all of the house-
holds in our sample violate the revealed preference axioms over the 2-
year sample period; on average, however, the MPI calculated for these
violations is small, suggesting that the violations of revealed preference
are not severe. This is supported by formal statistical testing, by which
the hypothesis of consumer rationality cannot be rejected.
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